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Abstract Widespread deployment of RFID system arises security and privacy concerns of users.
There are several proposals are in the literature to avoid these concerns, but most of them provides
reasonable privacy at the cost of search complexity on the server side. The search complexity increases
linearly with the number of tags in the system. Some schemes use a group based approach to solve
the search complexity problem. In this paper, we proposed a group based authentication protocol
for RFID system which is based on some characteristics of cyclic groups. The scheme uses only
bitwise XOR and mod operation for the computational work. Also, the scheme does not use any
pseudo-number generator on the tag-side. We use two benchmark metric based on anonymity set
to measure the privacy level of the system when some tags are compromised by an adversary. We
present some simulation results which show that the scheme preserves high level of privacy and
discloses very less amount of information when some tags are compromised. Furthermore, it’s formal
and informal analysis shows that our scheme preserves information privacy as well as un-traceability
and also withstand against various well known attacks.
Keywords RFID system · Cyclic group · Anonymity · Authentication protocol · Security · Privacy.
1 Introduction
RFID technology is becoming most promising technology in industries to improve the efficiency of
tracking and managing goods. Because of its convenience and low-cost, we encounter this technology
in various applications like supply chain management, logistics, access control, manufacturing, e-
health, passport verification etc [8] [20] [5] [15].
RFID system is made up with three entities: tags, readers, and back-end server. Each tag comprises
with a microchip for storing and processing data, and an antenna for receiving and transmitting
data. The server stores all the information about the tags and connected with the readers via a
secure channel while the readers communicate with the tags over an insecure channel [19] [7] [4] [9].
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With the widespread adoption of RFID system in our daily life, security and privacy concerns
are also arise critically [2] [6] [18]. We can use cryptography tool to avoid these concerns but the
main obstacle to deploy these tools in RFID system is tight constraints on power, memory and
computational capability on the tags.
To enhance the security and privacy of the RFID system and reduce the computational complexity,
researchers have been proposed a large number of authentication schemes. Here, we describe some
tree-based and group-based authentication schemes related to RFID system. In 2004, Molnar and
Wagner [12] proposed a tree-based approach for symmetric key authentication scheme. The scheme
reduces its identification complexity from linear to logarithmic. However, it violates the privacy
of the other tags when some tags are compromised by an adversary. In 2005, Nohara et al. [13]
proposed a similar kind of authentication scheme. The scheme provides higher privacy than [12]
in case of one tag is compromised. Buttya´n et al. [3] proposed an optimal key trees for tree-based
private authentication scheme in 2006. They used different branching factors at different levels of
the tree to enhancing the privacy level of the scheme. Also, they introduce a benchmark metric for
measuring privacy level of the system when some tags are compromised. In 2007, Avoine et al. [1]
developed a group based symmetric key authentication scheme. They improve the trade-off between
scalability and privacy by dividing the tags into a number of groups. Also, they analyze the privacy
level of the system by using privacy metric when a single tag is compromised as well as any number
of tags are compromised. The main draw back of the scheme is to decrease the privacy level when
more tags are compromised. In 2017, Rahman et al. [16] developed a secure anonymous private
authentication scheme which is similar to [1] except that the scheme used different technique to
provide better privacy and ensure more security. They used privacy metric same as in [1] to measure
the privacy level of the system. Also, the scheme used information leakage metric based on shannon
information theory [17] to measure the information leakage in bits of the system when some tags are
compromised.
After reviewing the work done, we would like to propose a similar kind of group based authentica-
tion scheme. The scheme uses some different kind of techniques to improve privacy and minimize
computational cost.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss preliminaries and details of our
system model. We present adversary model in Section 3. Group based authentication scheme for
RFID system is proposed in Section 4. The formal and informal analysis are given in Section 5.
Section 6 illustrates the performance of the proposed scheme. In Section 7, we measure the level
of privacy of the system when some tags are compromised by an adversary. We discuss simulation
results in Section 8. Finally, conclusions are made in Section 9.
2 Preliminaries and System Model
In this section, we give brief overview of a cyclic group [10] and using it’s properties, we develop our
RFID system model. In this system model, we assume that a reader and the server communicate
with each other via a secure communication channel. For simplicity, we assume that the reader and
the server are combined into one entity, called reader.
Suppose G be a nonempty set together with an operation ∗ that combines any two elements of G is
in G. The set G together with this operation is a group if it holds group’s law. The order of a group
G is the total number of elements in the group. It is denoted by |G|. Let H be a subset of a group
G. We say that H is a subgroup of G if it is itself a group under the operation of G.
Definition 2.01 A group G is called cyclic if there exists an element a ∈ G such that G =< a >=
{an | n ∈ Z}. The element a is called a generator of G.
Some important characteristics of cyclic groups are as follows:
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1. Suppose G =< a > be a cyclic group of order n. Then G =< ak > iff gcd(k, n) = 1.
2. Every subgroup of a cyclic group is cyclic.
3. Suppose G =< a > be a cyclic group of order n. The order of any subgroup of G is a divisor of
n.
4. For each positive divisor k of n, the group G has exactly one subgroup of order k denoted by
< an/k >.
Subgroup Index Tag Storage data
H1 =< a1 >
i1 T1i1 [ID1i1 ,K1i1 , r1i1old
, r1i1new ]
i2 T1i2 [ID1i2 ,K1i2 , r1i2old
, r1i2new ]
...
...
...
i|H1|−1 T1i|H1|−1
[ID1i|H1|−1
, K1i|H1|−1
, r1i(|H1 |−1)old
, r1i(|H1 |−1)new
]
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
Hm =< am >
i1 Tmi1 [IDmi1 ,Kmi1 , rmi1old
, rmi1new ]
i2 Tmi2 [IDmi2 ,Kmi2 , rmi2old
, rmi2new ]
...
...
...
i|Hm|−1 Tmi|Hm|−1
[IDmi|Hm|−1 ,Kmi|Hm|−1 , rmi(|Hm |−1)old
, rmi(|Hm|−1)new
]
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
Table 1 The server look-up table
We construct a system model for RFID system with the help of above mentioned characteristics of
cyclic groups. For this, we choose a cyclic group G =< a > of order n and find its some subgroups
Hi =< ai >, i = 1, 2, . . . , where ai = a
n/k for some positive divisor k, according to our requirement
using characteristics 4. According to characteristics 4, if ai and aj are generators of two different
subgroups Hi and Hj respectively, then ai and aj are distinct elements in G. For the system model,
with each element of Hi except the identity element, we assign a tag together with some secret
parameters. Additionally, if Hp is the highest order subgroup (say, |Hp| = P ) and Hp−1 is the
second highest order subgroup (say, |Hp−1| = Q) in the system. Then we utilize only Q number of
elements of Hp to assign tags in such a way so that the value of i (which is used as an index in server
look-up table) is same in both the subgroups.
We made a look-up table for the server which is shown in Table 1. From the Table 1, we can see that
with each element aij in Hj =< aj >, a tag Tji is assigned and i is used as a index in the look-up
table for the tag Tji. The server stores a unique identification number IDji and a secret key Kji to
the tag Tji. It also shows that two nonce rjiold and rjinew are associated with the tag Tji. Initially,
we take rjiold = 0 and rjinew be a nonce.
For each tag Tji which is associated with an element a
i
j in Hj , we store inverse of a
i
j in Hj , i.e.
(aij)
−1, and i in the tag’s internal memory. We also store a unique identification number IDji, a
secret key Kji, and a nonce R4 inside the tag’s memory. Initially, R4 is same as rjinew which is stored
in the server’s look-up table for tag Tji.
3 Adversary Model
In this section, we present the ability of an adversary A . The adversary is capable to interact with
the RFID system S and also, eavesdrops, intercepts, and modifies any transmitted message between
any reader and any tag in the system. Our adversarial model is similar to the model proposed by
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Juels and Weis [11] with some modifications to meet our requirement. A is also able to send the
following queries to an oracle.
1. SendTag(m,Tji)→ m
′
The adversary A may send a message m to the tag Tji which responds with message m
′.
2. SendReader(m,R)→ m′
A can intract with a reader R by sending a message m. The reader R responds with message
m′.
3. DrawTags(S)
The adversary has access to a set of tags at any time from the system with this oracle query.
4. Corrupt(Tji)
A is able to access the volatile memory as well as non volatile memory of a tag Tji.
We also bound the adversary A to use SendTag and SendReader queries by r and t respectively. A
can performs s number of computational steps. At a time, A is able to send Corrupt message to
atmost (n− 2) number of tags where n is the total number of tags obtained from DrawTags query.
3.1 Privacy Experiment
We denote privacy experiment for an RFID system S by EXP priv
A ,S [k, n, r, s, t], where r, s, and
t represent the capability of an adversary to use SendTag, computations steps and SendReader
respectively. Also, k represents a security parameter. An RFID authentication protocol is considered
to be private if no adversary has significant advantage in this experiment.
The main goal of the adversary in the experiment is to distinguish between two different tags with
in its computational and interaction limits. The experiment is composed in three phases as follows:
1. Learning Phase: The adversary A interacts with the system S and inqueries oracle queries
without exceeding its bound and analyze them.
2. Challenging Phase: A selects two uncorrupted tags from the pool obtained by Drawtags oracle.
A randomly selects any one from them. The adversary evaluates oracles on that particular tag.
3. Guessing Phase: A outputs a guess bit b. A is expected to produce 1 if he succeeds, otherwise
0.
EXP succeed if b = 1.
3.2 Privacy Definition [(r, s, t)-privacy]
According to Juels and Weis [11], an RFID authentication protocol with security parameter k is
(r, s, t)-private if
Pr[EXP priv
A ,S [k, n, r, s, t] succeeds in guessing b] ≤
1
2
+
1
poly(k)
,
where poly(k) is any polynomial function of k.
4 Process
In this section, we propose a group based authentication protocol which works under all circum-
stances required for RFID systems. Used notations in this protocol are given in Table 2, and proposed
protocol is shown in Figure 1. The work flow of the proposed scheme is as follows:
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Notation Description
G =< a > A finite cyclic group.
Hj =< aj > A subgroup of the group G with generator element aj .
(akj )
−1 Inverse element of akj in the subgroup Hj .
Rm : m = 1, 2, 3 Nonce generated by the reader.
Kji Secret key of a tag Tji associated with the i
th element of a subgroup Hj .
IDji Unique identification number of the tag Tji.
⊕ Exclusive-or operation.
Table 2 Notations and symbols used in proposed scheme
Reader Tag
Computes α = (ai
k
)−1 ⊕ R4.
Extracts R1 and R2 from received
β and γ respectively. It computes
δ = (ID ⊕ R1) mod ((a
i
k
)−1 ⊕ R2).
Extracts R3 from recevied ζ and
computes η′, and checks η′ ≈
η. If holds, updates R4 = R3.
Authentication success
Authentication failure
Y
With the help of received i and
stored database, the server computes
α′ and checks α′ ≈ α for each
subgroup until it gets the right tag.
Generates two nonce R1 and R2, and
computes β = R1 ⊕K, γ = R2 ⊕K.
It computes δ′ and checks δ′ ≈ δ
Generates a nonce R3 and updates
rn = R3. Computes ζ = R3 ⊕K and
η = (ID ⊕ R3) mod ((a
i
k
)−1 ⊕ R1).
Y
Y
N
N
Y
msg1 = {i, α}
msg2 = {β, γ}
msg3 = {δ}
msg4 = {ζ, η}
N
Fig. 1 Proposed Mutual Authentication Protocol
1. msg1 : Tki → R : {i, α}
The tag Tki computes α = (a
i
k)
−1 ⊕ R4 and forms a request message msg1 = {i, α}. The tag
sends msg1 to a reader R.
2. msg2 : R→ Tki : {β, γ}
After receiving the tag’s request message msg
1
, the reader uses i as an index (as in Table 1) to
performs the following steps for all the subgroups until it finds the right tag:
(a) It calculates the inverse of aik in Hk, where ak is the generator of subgroup Hk.
(b) The reader computes α′ = (aik)
−1 ⊕ rkiold/rkinew and checks whether α
′ is equal to the
received α or not. If so, it gets the right tag Tki (say) inside the subgroup Hk. If fails, the
reader terminates the protocol.
(c) The reader generates two nonce R1 and R2, and computes β = R1⊕Kki, γ = R2⊕Kki, where
Kki is the secret key of the tag Tki. The reader forms a response message msg2 = {β, γ} and
transmits it to the tag.
6 Pramod Kumar Maurya, Satya Bagchi
3. msg
3
: Tki → R : {δ}
Upon receiving the response message msg2, the tag Tki extracts R1 and R2 from β and γ
respectively with the help of its secret key Kki. It computes δ = (IDki⊕R1) mod ((a
i
k)
−1⊕R2)
and send δ inside the response message msg3 = {δ} to the reader.
4. msg4 : R→ Tki : {ζ, η}
After receiving messagemsg3 from the tag Tki, the reader calculates δ
′ = (IDki⊕R1) mod ((a
i
k)
−1⊕
R2) for the tag Tki and checks whether δ
′ is equal to the received δ or not. If it holds, the reader
authenticates the tag Tki otherwise terminates the session. If tag’s authentication succeed, the
reader generates a nonce R3 and assigns rkiold = rkinew , and rkinew = R3. Simultaneously, also
computes ζ = R3 ⊕ Kki, η = (IDki ⊕ R3) mod ((a
i
k)
−1 ⊕ R1) and forms a response message
msg4 = {ζ, η}. It sends msg4 to the tag Tki.
5. Upon receiving message msg4, the tag Tki extracts R3 from ζ and calculates η
′ = (IDki ⊕ R3)
mod ((aik)
−1 ⊕ R1). The tag checks whether η
′ is equal to the received η or not. If so, the tag
authenticates the reader and updates R4 = R3 for further communication.
5 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we present formal and informal analysis of our proposed scheme with respect to
above mentioned adversary model. The formal analysis shows that the proposed scheme preserves
privacy and un-traceability. Also, it’s informal analysis shows that the proposed scheme is secure
against various well-known attacks.
5.1 Formal Security Analysis
Theorem 1 The proposed scheme attains information privacy with respect to a adversary A .
Proof We assume that the proposed scheme does not preserve information privacy. So the success
probability of the adversary to win experiment is non-negligible. A ’s privacy game is composed in
three phases as follows:
– Learning Phase: The adversary gets a set of n-tags by querying DrawTags oracle. A can send
any oracle queries to a tag Ti (say) without exceeding its computation bound and analyze them.
A can use Corrupt oracle to atmost n− 2 tags.
Ti ← DrawTag(S)
msg1 = {i, α} ← SendTag(init, Ti)
msg2 = {β, γ} ← SendReader(msg1, R)
msg3 = {i, δ} ← SendTag(msg2, Ti)
msg4 = {ζ, η} ← SendReader(msg3, R)
{i, (aij)
−1,K, ID,R} ← Corrupt(Ti).
– Challenge Phase: The adversary A selects two uncorrupted tags say, Ti and Tj, from the set of
tags obtained by DrawTags query as its challenge tags. Let T ∗
0
= Ti, T
∗
1
= Tj , and b ∈ {0, 1}. A
randomly selects Tb among them and analyze all queries run on it. Note that A is not able to
use Corrupt oracle on that particular tag Tb.
msg1 = {i, α} ← SendTag(init, Tb)
msg2 = {β, γ} ← SendReader(msg1, R)
msg3 = {i, δ} ← SendTag(msg2, Tb)
msg4 = {ζ, η} ← SendReader(msg3, R).
– Guess Phase: Eventually, the adversary outputs a guess bit b′ for the corresponding tag.
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The adversary wins the experiment if b′ = b. It is possible only when the adversary knows all the
secrets stored in Tb’s internal memory as well as the mother group G. So our assumption is wrong.
Hence the proposed scheme preserves the information privacy with respect to A .
Theorem 2 The proposed scheme provides un-traceability with respect to the adversary A .
Proof Let us assume that the proposed scheme is traceable. i.e. the adversary can trace a tag at any
time. This means A is able to distinguish between two tags. We show that our assumption is wrong
with the help of A ’s privacy game which is as follows:
– Learning Phase: A uses DrawTags query for the system S and gets access to n-tags. For all the
tags, A sends SendTag and SendReader queries to get transmitted information among a reader
and tags. The adversary analyzes all the transmitted message. The adversary can use Corrupt
query for atmost n− 2 tags because the goal of the privacy game is to distinguish between two
uncorrupted tags.
Ti ← DrawTag(S)
msg1 = {i, α} ← SendTag(init, Ti)
msg2 = {β, γ} ← SendReader(msg1, R)
msg3 = {i, δ} ← SendTag(msg2, Ti)
msg4 = {ζ, η} ← SendReader(msg3, R)
{i, (aij)
−1,K, ID,R} ← Corrupt(Ti).
– Challenge Phase: The adversary selects two uncorrupted tags Ti and Tj to which it did not
send Corrupt query in the learning phase. A randomly selects Tb : b ∈ {i, j} among them. The
adversary queries all the oracle queries except Corrupt query to the tag Tb and evaluates them.
msg∗
1
= {i, α} ← SendTag(init, Tb)
msg∗
2
= {β, γ} ← SendReader(msg∗
1
, R)
msg∗3 = {i, δ} ← SendTag(msg
∗
2 , Tb)
msg∗
4
= {ζ, η} ← SendReader(msg∗
3
, R).
– Guess Phase: A outputs a guess bit b′.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b but it is possible only when if
Pr[msg∗
1
= msg1] = 1
Since the message msg1 depend upon the tag’s nonce R4 which is different in each protocol run. So
our assumption is wrong. Hence the adversary is unable to trace the tag.
5.2 Informal Security Analysis
5.2.1 Replay Attack Resistance
An adversary can eavesdrops the wireless channel and keeps all the transmitted messages between a
reader and a tag. The adversary uses these message into another session to disguise itself as the tag
or the reader to deceive the other one. In the proposed scheme, it is infeasible for an adversary to
forge messages as a valid tag/reader because each transmitted message incorporates a fresh nonce in
each authentication session which can not be get by the adversary (since the nonce XOR with some
other secret parameters). This makes all the replayed message by the adversary are illegal message.
Thus the scheme prevents strongly the replay attack.
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5.2.2 De-synchronization Attack Resistance
For each tag, the server stores two nonce rold and rnew in its database to save the scheme from
the de-synchronization attack. The server also updates these values after a successful authentication
session. An adversary intercepts or modified any transmitted message in one session in such a way
so that a tag does not update the value of stored nonce. The server can authenticate the legitimate
tag by its old value stored in database into another session. So it is not possible for an adversary to
de-synchronize the scheme.
5.2.3 Man-in-Middle Attack Resistance
An adversary is unable to act as a middle man in between a reader and a tag because it is infeasible
for the adversary to intercepts any transmitted message without knowing the secret key, unique
identification number, and knowledge about the cyclic group. The probability of guessing or calcu-
lating these values from the transmitted message is negligible because a fresh nonce is used in each
transmitted message.
6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we present efficiency of our proposed scheme in terms of tag computation, server
computation, and storage, as described in Table 3. The proposed scheme’s search complexity is O(γ)
which is same as in Avione et al. [1] but better than Rahman et al. [16]. During the authentication
phase, the scheme performs only bit-wise XOR operation whereas schemes of Avoine et al. and
Rahman et al. perform symmetric key encryption and decryption. Also, the proposed scheme does
not use any pseudo number generator function for generating nonce on the tag-side. It uses nonce
generated by the reader. We assume that all the parameters used in the proposed scheme are L-bits
long. On the tag side, our scheme keeps five items. Thus the storage cost is 5L bits. The proposed
scheme also provides mutual authentication among a reader and tags. When we compare with [1]
and [16] in terms of computation, the proposed scheme performs very less computation which is
optimal for the real world tiny powered tags.
Protocol Entity Avoine Rahman Proposed protocol
[1] [16]
Symmetric encryption/ T 2 2 ×
decryption R 2 2 ×
Search complexity R O(γ) O(γ + |pi|) O(γ)
No. of PRNG T 1 1 ×
Required memory T 3L (m + 2)L 5L
Mutual authentication × × X
γ- Total number of groups in the system.
|pi| - Total number of secret keys of a tag associated with the identifier IDx.
m - Number of identifier is assigned to each tag.
Table 3 Computation cost performance comparison
7 Measurement of Privacy
In this section, we analyze the privacy level of our proposed scheme in terms of anonymity set and
data leakage in bits. For the anonymity sets, we use privacy metric introdued by [3]. Also, we use
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another metric says information leakage for data leakage proposed by shannon [17] and used in [14]
[16] to measure the information (in bits) disclosed by the proposed scheme when some tags are
compromised.
Both the metric use disjoint partition sets of tags for observation. When some tags are compromised,
the set of all tags are partitioned in such a way so that the adversary can not distinguish the tags
that belong to the same partition but she can distinguish the tags belong to different partitions.
Here, |Pi| denotes the size of such partition Pi and
|Pi|
N is the probability that a randomly chosen
tag belongs to partition Pi.
7.1 Level of privacy based on anonymity set
The level of privacy ℜ based on anonymity set is characterized as average anonymity set size nor-
malized with the total number of tags N [3] [1] [16].
ℜ =
1
N
∑
i
|Pi|
|Pi|
N
=
1
N2
∑
i
|Pi|
2. (1)
In the proposed scheme, if a tag is compromised, it does not leak any information about the subgroup
in which it belongs. For this reason, the adversary can not distinguish between two tags whether
they belongs to same subgroup or not. So, if C is the total number of compromised tags in the whole
system, we partitioned the system into C number of anonymity sets with size 1 and one another
anonymity set of size (N − C). Using equation 1, the level of privacy ℜ achieved by our scheme is
ℜ =
1
N2
{C+ (N − C)2}, (2)
where N is the total number of tags in the system and C is the total number of compromised tags
in the system.
7.2 Level of privacy based on information leakage in bits
According to Rahman et al. [16], if an adversary partitioned a system with N tags into k disjoint
sets, then the information leakage in bits can be expressed as follows:
I =
k∑
i=1
|Pi|
N
log2
(
N
|Pi|
)
. (3)
In the proposed scheme, if C is the total number of compromised tags in the system. Then we
partitioned the system with N tags into C anonymity sets of size 1 and one another anonymity set
of size (N − C). According to our partitions, the information leakage in bits is as follows
I =
C
N
log2N +
(N − C)
N
log2
(
N
N − C
)
. (4)
8 Experimental Results
In this section, we compare our scheme with Avoine et al. [1] and Rahman et al. [16] using a matlab
simulation. The simulation is done using the expressions (1) - (4). In the simulation, we assume that
the system has N = 210 number of tags and all the tags are divided into 32 groups. We choose range
of compromised tags from 0 to 600. In the proposed scheme, it is not necessary to take same number
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Fig. 3 Level of privacy of the system based on information leakage in bits
of tags in each groups. In the simulation, we run 100 simulations for each value of compromised tags
C in the system. In each simulation run, compromised tags are chosen uniformly random from the
groups of all tags. Finally, we average all the obtained values over all simulation runs. The simulation
results are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The simulation results of the Figure 2 shows that the
privacy level achieved by the proposed scheme is 94.42% and 98.43% better than Rahman et al. and
Avoine et al. respectively, when C becomes 600 in a similar setup. According to simulation result
shown in Figure 3, the proposed scheme discloses 22.62% and 34.05% less information than Rahman
et al. and Avoine et al. respectively when C becomes 600. Thus the proposed scheme achieves higher
improvement in terms of privacy level and information leakage than the other schemes, when some
tags are compromised by an adversary.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a group based authentication scheme for RFID system based
on a cyclic group. The detailed formal analysis shows that it preserves information privacy and
un-traceability. The informal analysis shows that the scheme resists various existing attacks. The
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performance analysis illustrates that the scheme uses very less resources on tags to performs compu-
tational work and storage data. The experimental results show that our scheme preserves high level
privacy when some tags are compromised. Thus, the analysis and prominent features conclude that
the scheme is secure and efficient for a low-cost RFID system.
Conflict of Interest: The author P K Maurya thanks to MHRD, India, for financial support of
his research.
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